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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Objectives:  In England,  proposed  service  changes  such  as Emergency  Department  closures
typically face  local  opposition.  Consequently,  public  consultation  exercises  often  involve
protracted,  hostile  debates.  This  study  examined  a process  aimed  at engaging  a community
in  decision-making  about  service  reconﬁguration,  and  the  public  response  to this process.
Methods:  A documentary  analysis  was  conducted  to map  consultation  methods  used  in an
urban area  of  England  where  plans  to  consolidate  hospital  services  on  fewer  sites  were
under discussion.  In-depth  interviews  (n =  20)  were  conducted  with  parents,  older  people,
and patient  representatives.  The  analysis  combined  inductive  and  deductive  approaches,
informed  by risk  communication  theories.
Results:  The  commissioners  provided  a large  volume  of  information  about  the  changes,
alongside  a programme  of public  events.  However,  the  complexity  of the  process,  together
with what  members  of the  public  perceived  to  be the commissioners’  dismissal  of  their
concerns,  led  the community  to question  their  motivation.  This  was  compounded  by  a
widespread  perception  that  the proposals  were  ﬁnancially  driven.
Discussion:  Government  policy  emphasises  the  importance  of  clinical  leadership  and ‘evi-
dence’ in public  consultation.  However,  an  engagement  process  based  on  this  approach
fuelled  hostility  to  the  proposals.  Policymakers  should  not  assume  communities  can  be
persuaded  to accommodate  service  change  which  may  result  in reduced  access  to care.
©  2015  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  Ireland  Ltd.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under1. Introduction
Health care systems around the world face the chal-
lenge of meeting rising demand for care with diminishing
ﬁnancial resources [1,2]. Attempts to tackle this dilemma
may  involve reorganising health care, for example by con-
solidating services across a region on fewer hospital sites.
In England, whilst decision-makers seek potential health
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 020 7679 8285.
E-mail address: h.barratt@ucl.ac.uk (H. Barratt).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2015.04.015
0168-8510/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd. 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).the  CC BY license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
gains for patients by reorganising care, as well as cost sav-
ings, service change proposals often face public opposition.
This commonly centres on concerns about future access to
services [3,4]. Plans to alter Emergency Department (ED)
services typically create the greatest concern [5]. Much of
the public anxiety relates to the safety of centralised ser-
vices and the potential risks that may  be involved in having
to travel further for care in an emergency [5]. Communities
often argue that ‘lives will be put at risk,’ if such proposals
go ahead [1].
Consequently, risk is part of the national discourse
about service reorganisation, or reconﬁguration. In the UK,
This is an open access article under the CC BY license
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Key  reasons why   reconﬁguraon  proposals  are  referred   to th e  Indepe nden t 
Reconﬁguraon Panel:[1]
• Inadeq uat e  commun ity  and  stakeh older  en gagement  in the  early   stages  of 
pla nning change
• The  clinical case has not been c onvinci ngly  described  or p romoted
• Clin ical  integraon ac ross  sites   and  a  broader   vis ion  of  integra on  into  the 
whole health com munit y has been  weak
• Proposals  that  emph asize what cann ot be done and underp lay  the  beneﬁts  of 
change and plans for addional services
• Important content missing fr om reconﬁgura on pla ns and limited  methods of 
conveying informa on
• Health agenci es caugh t on the bac k foot about the  three  iss ues  most  likel y to 
exci te local opinion – money,  tra nsport  and emerge ncy care
• Inadeq uat e aen on given to the resp onses  duri ng and aer the  consu lta onH. Barratt et al. / Health
econﬁguration is deﬁned as ‘a deliberately induced change
f some signiﬁcance in the distribution of medical, surgi-
al, diagnostic and ancillary specialties that are available
n each hospital or other secondary or tertiary acute care
nit in locality, region or health care administrative area’
6]. It is a measure of change that directly addresses opera-
ional rather than structural change: hospitals may  merge,
orm networks, or change their divisional or governance
tructures, without reconﬁguring services. Spurgeon et al.
oint to parallels between the reconﬁguration process
nd the literature about technological or environmental
isks. Public perceptions about the risks involved in service
econﬁguration are frequently at odds with the view put
orward by ‘expert’ decision-makers, as is often the case
ith environmental hazards. They suggest that this may
e because proponents and opponents of change operate
ithin different paradigms of understanding about risk [4].
ociologist Brian Wynne’s research about the intersection
f lay and expert knowledge offers a means of explaining
his. Informed by the contextual model of risk communica-
ion, Wynne acknowledges that individuals do not simply
espond as empty containers for information [7,8]. Instead,
he way the public process risk information is shaped by
heir previous experiences and personal circumstances [9].
ynne argues that the public are likely to be sceptical,
ritical or hostile to scientiﬁc statements when ‘expert’
ccounts of physical reality conﬂict with their knowledge
nd understanding [10].
In England, Section 242 of the NHS Act 2006 requires
ealth care managers and purchasers – known as commis-
ioners – to seek the views of affected parties, including
atients and the public, if changes to local NHS services
re being considered [11]. However, this consultation pro-
ess often involves protracted, sometimes hostile local
ebates, leading to delays which some argue pose ‘sig-
iﬁcant risks to the delivery of safe services’ [12]. At the
ame time, there is a perception that the public do not in
eality have an opportunity to inﬂuence the outcome of
he decision-making process [5]. The Independent Recon-
guration Panel (IRP), provides the UK government with
ndependent advice about reconﬁguration proposals, when
ocal agreement cannot be reached [1]. Local government
epresentatives in affected areas may  refer proposals to the
ecretary of State for Health if they believe either that the
onsultation has been inadequate, or that the proposals are
ot in the best interest of the local population. The Sec-
etary of State may  then seek the advice of the IRP [12].
y mid-2012 the IRP had undertaken 19 full reviews of
ontested plans for health service change in England and
ffered written advice on several others [3]. The most fre-
uent reasons for referral to the IRP are listed in Fig. 1
1].
In light of these concerns, several groups have called for
mprovements in both the policy and process of public con-
ultation about proposed service reorganisations [5,12]. To
ddress this, government documents increasingly empha-
ise the role of ‘evidence’ and better consultation with the
ublic, apparently assuming that if local communities are
involved enough’ and are presented with the ‘right evi-
ence’ they will be convinced of the need to change [6].
owever, Wynne and others have repeatedly shown thatFig. 1. Key reasons why  reconﬁguration proposals are referred to the
Independent Reconﬁguration Panel.
efforts to ‘educate’ the public by decreasing ‘deﬁcits’ in
their understanding typically fail because the ‘expert’ view
conﬂicts with local people’s knowledge and understanding
[4,13].
A  limited literature examines the process of reconﬁg-
uring hospital services, especially the dynamics of local
decision-making [5]. Two previous studies explored the
views of a range of individuals engaged in reorganisation
[5,6], but neither examined the public engagement process
in detail. This paper presents the ﬁndings of a qualitative
study examining the process of public engagement in an
urban area where major changes to hospital emergency
services were being proposed, and the local community’s
response to this process. We  have conceptualised the pub-
lic consultation process as a process of risk communication.
We have drawn on theories of risk communication as an
analytical focus, including the work of Wynne, to examine
the ways in which the public responded to the consultation
process.
2. Methods
Documentary analysis was used to establish back-
ground details about the proposed service changes and the
consultation process. This included drivers for change; how
the reorganisation was governed and developed; as well as
the methods used to involve stakeholders in the decision-
making process.
In order to explore the factors that inﬂuenced the public
response to the consultation process, detailed, individ-
ual data were required. These were gathered in one to
one interviews – an approach which permits the in-depth
exploration of each participant’s preferences, motivations
and decisions [14].
2.1. Study context
Participants were all residents in an urban area of
England referred to as ‘Greenville’. At the time, a public
consultation was taking place locally about consolidating a
range of hospital services on fewer sites, including emer-
gency care. If the proposals went ahead, an urgent care
centre for minor injuries and ailments would replace the
Emergency Department (ED) at the local district general
hospital, ‘Greenville Hospital.’ Residents would be required
1212 H. Barratt et al. / Health Policy 119 (2015) 1210–1217
Table 1
Participant demographic characteristics.
Number of
participants
Number of
females
Number from Black and
Minority Ethnic Groups
Age range
Parents 5 5 1 28–40
Older  participants 6 2 0 65–85
 
 Patient
representatives
9  4
Total  20 11
to travel to another hospital in the area, if they needed to
access the services of a full ED.
2.2. Documentary analysis
Documentation regarding the Greenville proposals and
the public consultation process was collected, principally
via the dedicated website and online archive set up by
the commissioners proposing the changes. This included
strategy documents; records of public meetings and other
events; the proposals for change; documentation about the
governance of the reconﬁgurations (such as meeting min-
utes); as well as local media coverage. Documentation was
collected over the lifespan of the study. Qualitative content
analysis was carried out, using the systematic method set
out by Kohlbacher and others [15].
2.3. Semi-structured interviews
2.3.1. Interviewees
Interviews were carried out with individuals from a
range of groups, including those likely to attend the ED
(older people and parents of young children) [16]; as
well as patient representatives. The latter group included
members of formal local patient involvement groups and
individuals campaigning against the closure of services on
behalf of patients. Participants’ demographic characteris-
tics are outlined in Table 1.
Face-to-face semi-structured interviews took place
between August 2012 and November 2012, usually at the
interviewee’s home. Interviews typically lasted between
45 min  and 1 h and were recorded and transcribed for anal-
ysis. Interviewees were anonymised and details identifying
the sites were removed. Participant study numbers are
used here to set quotes in context.
2.3.2. Interview design and analysis
A thematic analysis of the interview data was  carried
out, combining inductive and deductive approaches, using
theories about risk communication as an analytic focus,
whilst at the same time allowing novel themes to emerge
direct from the data [17]. The topic guide for the interviews
and the initial broad headings used for analysis both drew
on empirical literature regarding the reconﬁguration pro-
cess and conceptual literature about risk communication
[18,19]. Pre-deﬁned themes, derived from both litera-
tures, included public engagement, drivers of change, local
emergency services and hospital reconﬁguration propo-
sals. These themes were expanded and reﬁned inductively
and new themes were added to the initial framework [14].2 60–76
3 28–85
A sample of the transcripts was  read by the full research
team to identify and agree key themes, after which one
researcher coded the interview transcripts. N-Vivo (version
10) was  used to manage the analysis.
3. Results
3.1. Consultation methods
The public consultation in Greenville took place prior
to April 2013, when local clinical commissioning groups
(CCGs) in England assumed responsibility for purchasing
NHS care from primary care trusts (PCTs). A consultation
document formed the basis of the process and included
questions for members of the public to respond to in writ-
ing. It described how the proposed service changes were
developed by the local CCGs, made up of GPs represent-
ing the PCTs, working with ‘hospital doctors, nurse leaders,
providers of community care, social services, patient and
volunteer groups and charities.’ In the document, the com-
missioners set out a range of reasons why they believed
local services ‘needed to change in order to improve qual-
ity.’ As noted, the proposed changes included consolidating
local emergency services on fewer sites. Consequently, in
the future, only some of the hospitals in the area would
provide a full ED service, emergency surgery, maternity
and inpatient paediatric services. Their preferred option for
Greenville was  to downgrade services on that site, so that
the hospital would be left with an urgent care centre, rather
than a full emergency service. Most local residents would
be expected to travel to the ED at one of the remaining
hospitals closest to Greenville.
In all the documentation, particular emphasis was
placed on the fact that the plans had been developed by
local clinicians. Many of these individuals had worked in
the area for a long time, and thus it was argued that
they understood the local health care economy very well.
The documentation also explained that a range of chal-
lenges threatened to impact the delivery of patient care
locally, including a growing and ageing population; insuf-
ﬁcient numbers of specialists in hospitals to provide round
the clock care; inadequate NHS facilities; and increasing
ﬁnancial pressures on the NHS. Consequently, the commis-
sioners sought public views about a range of options aimed
at consolidating care on few sites, to make better use of staff
expertise, buildings and funds.
Documentation was distributed across the area to GP
practices, libraries, hospitals and other health sites, phar-
macies, patient groups and local authority ofﬁces. The main
consultation document was  supplemented with a number
of other publications, including factsheets about changes
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o speciﬁc services; answers to frequently asked questions;
nd a public letter outlining the support of senior local clini-
ians. A dedicated website was created and advertisements
ere placed in local papers across the affected area and
eighbouring regions.
The commissioners also organised a number of pub-
ic events, including focus groups, roadshows, meetings in
ospitals and GP events, as well as public meetings and
ebates, with the aim of involving ‘as many people and
ommunities’ in the affected area as possible. As well as
egistering their views at the events, local residents could
espond to the consultation in a number of ways, including
n online or paper response form. A number of petitions
ere also submitted by email and post. Paper documenta-
ion was distributed in a range of languages. Responses to
he consultation were collated and analysed by a large mar-
et research company. A ﬁnal engagement event was  then
eld to present the consultation ﬁndings to local stake-
olders and gather views about further issues that should
e taken into account going forward. Subsequently, a joint
ommittee of local PCTs made a ﬁnal decision about the
roposals.
.2. Public involvement in the consultation process
In terms of involvement in the public consultation pro-
ess, there were three distinct groups of participants. The
rst group, whom we refer to as the ‘campaigners against
hange’ (n = 6), strongly opposed the proposals. These indi-
iduals had all been recruited to the study as patient
epresentatives and had all sought to express their views
ia the consultation process. However, their opposition had
lso led them to get involved in a range of activities above
nd beyond this formal process. This included arranging
heir own meetings, campaigning in the street, collecting
etition signatures and assisting others to complete the
onsultation documents. In addition, interviewees in this
roup all expressed a strong belief that the state should
rovide communities with a comprehensive local health
ervice.
The second group, in contrast, included two participants
ho were broadly in favour of the proposed changes in
reenville. We  have termed this group ‘non-campaigners
n favour of change.’ One of the two, an older interviewee,
ad previously worked closely with the medical profession;
he other was a member of a patient involvement group.
oth had engaged with the consultation process principally
y attending the public events.
We have termed the third group, which includes all the
emaining participants, ‘non-campaigners against change’
n = 12). In this group, most were concerned about the
afety implications of having to travel further for care in
uture. Their opposition was underpinned by an implicit
elief that timely access to hospital in an emergency is
irectly associated with better outcomes [20]. However,
nly three of the participants in this group (two parent
articipants; one older person) reported that they had com-
leted the ofﬁcial consultation document, or attended any
f the public events. The remaining nine participants had
ot engaged with the consultation process at all.19 (2015) 1210–1217 1213
In summary, all the ‘campaigners against change’ and
the ‘non-campaigners in favour of change’ had regis-
tered their views via the consultation process, either by
responding to the questions set out in the consultation
document or by attending one of the public engagement
events. In contrast, only one third of the ‘non-campaigners
against change’ reported taking part. Interviewees who had
participated in the consultation form the focus of this
paper. There were two major factors that inﬂuenced the
way in which these individuals responded to the process:
the behaviour of the commissioners leading the exercise;
and the methods used to elicit public feedback. The impact
of each of these factors is now described in turn, before we
consider their consequences.
3.3. Impact of commissioner approaches to consultation
As we  have described, the commissioners emphasised
that the plans had been developed by local clinicians, many
of whom had worked in the area for a long time. How-
ever, there was little sense that many of the participants
acknowledged that the proposals were clinically-led, or
considered this to be important. Most simply referred to the
decision-makers behind the plans as an anonymous ‘them.’
In contrast, many of the ‘campaigners against change’
had engaged with the commissioners directly. A local clini-
cal leader represented the public face of the reconﬁguration
for many in this group, as he had personally met with a
number of community groups to discuss the proposals.
Commissioners are encouraged to use an ‘expert’ to present
the case for change, usually a senior clinician, whose view
– it is thought – will carry weight with the community
[21]. However, many participants in Greenville remained
sceptical about the proposals and simply did not believe
the claims put forward by the commissioners, even though
the clinical leader had visited patient groups ‘on numerous
occasions’, as one put it (Patient Representative 6).
One reason for this scepticism was  that the local
community did not believe that the commissioners had
considered issues of relevance to them when the propo-
sals were ﬁrst developed. Referring to the clinical leader
fronting the proposals, one participant said:
I think he’s probably a very clever clinician, but this is
not just about clinical factors. This is about a much big-
ger issue of logistics, of infrastructure, of access. I mean
I’m sure he’s a very clever man, but he’s looking at it in
a very cold, clinical [way]. (Patient Representative 7)
This was  compounded by the view held by many, that
the proposals were aimed principally at cutting costs,
rather than improving patient care – a perspective that is
often shared by members of the public when such changes
are proposed [1]. In fact some disputed the claim that the
plans would improve care at all:
This is all to do with the political cuts. Cuts. This has
nothing to do with trying to improve A&E. NHS. It’s not
going to be better. (Patient Representative 2)
Later in the consultation process, the commission-
ers organised several open meetings to facilitate the
 Policy 11214 H. Barratt et al. / Health
engagement of the community with the plans. However,
their behaviour at the meetings had created the impression
for some attendees that the public’s concerns were trivial
and irrelevant:
The people running [the meetings] have been somewhat
arrogant in the way they’ve talked to clients. Obviously
that doesn’t help. I mean you need genuine consultation,
with the professionals prepared to listen, not dismissing
arguments as trivial. (Older Person 3)
The public meetings were held at prominent venues,
where refreshments were provided. This also impacted on
the perception that the meetings ‘were not very genuine’
(Patient Representative 9) and that there was ‘some soft
soaping going on.’ (Older Person 2)
It was obvious that they were trying to impress people,
because lunch was laid on. Because of that, there was
a long queue to get in, and I think maybe people came
just for the lunch, I don’t know. If people are giving you
lunch instead of the facts, they’ve already decided and
they’re trying to make it softer for you. (Older Person 2)
At the same time, whilst some commissioners sought to
engage with the local community, others were perceived
to have failed to engage adequately. This also inﬂuenced
participants’ perceptions of the process:
I want to feel that I can trust the people who are making
those [decisions]. It’s about trust. These bloody meet-
ings I went to, the person who never turned up was the
woman who’s going to run health care in Greenville, the
clinical commissioning group. She never turned up at
the public meeting at the Town Hall, she never turned
up at a volunteers’ meeting that I got up at seven in
the morning to go to. She just never turned up. (Patient
Representative 7)
The commissioner’s failure to attend the public meet-
ings and engage in discussion led this participant to
question whether or not the individuals putting for-
ward the proposals could be trusted. On the other hand,
the behaviour of commissioners who did meet with
the local community raised questions for some par-
ticipants about whether the factors most relevant to
the public, such as access, were taken into account in
the decision-making process or had been dismissed as
trivial.
3.4. Impact of consultation methods
Alongside the public meetings, the local community
were invited to put forward their views about the pro-
posed changes by responding to a series of questions set
out in the consultation document. This process of collecting
feedback was the second key factor that inﬂuenced those
participants who took part in the consultation exercise.
This related to both the volume of documentation provided
by the commissioners, including the length of the feedback
questionnaire, as well as the way in which the consultation
questions were posed.19 (2015) 1210–1217
The consultation document itself was over 80 pages
long, and residents were asked to respond to around 30
questions. Participants spoke about ‘a massive document’
(Parent 3) and ‘a massive questionnaire.’ (Older Person 3)
For some, the length of the document represented a barrier
to them responding:
It’s like they’re trying to mess with your heads. I don’t
know how many pages it is – I have two  kids, I want to
take part, but how long is it going to take me?  They’re
making it too long. It’s just unnecessary. (Parent 4)
The ‘campaigners against change’ also expressed con-
cern that, despite its length and the pledges to improve
care, the document was not transparent about the implica-
tions of the proposals for patients. This particularly related
to the possible closure of local services, such as the emer-
gency and maternity departments. Patient Representative
5, a member of a patient involvement group, described the
approach of the commissioners in compiling the consulta-
tion document as ‘deliberate obfuscation.’ She added:
It was outrageously complex and it, I mean it was just. . .
It was  not the sort of thing that you put before the gen-
eral public. (Patient Representative 5)
Equally, the phrasing of the questions was perceived
by some to have excluded opportunities for the public to
express disagreement with the plans:
[There was] no option to say ‘actually I fundamentally
disagree with all those proposals’ so we just had to write
all over our forms we  strongly disagree and we think
that you should keep our hospitals exactly as they are.
(Patient Representative 9)
Other participants perceived the consultation questions
to be leading respondents into agreeing with the proposals:
The way  the questions were posed, led you into
agreeing. . . I mean, it was  a very, very ill.  . . No, not ill
conceived – they did exactly what they wanted – but it
was  not a consultation as I understand it, which is about
getting agreement around the issue and then looking at
how it could be tackled. It was  very much, ‘our preferred
option is this, but if you want to vote for Greenville Hos-
pital, you can close [another hospital instead],’ so it was
pitting communities against communities and hospitals
against hospitals and things like that. And you know, it
all started off with, you know, ‘would you like better
services and more services?’ And they all looked sort of,
‘oh yeah that’s a good idea’ and then you get to it, ‘well
of course you’ve got to do what we  say then.’ (Patient
Representative 8)
3.5. Consequences
Disenchantment with the consultation process led
many of those who  participated to question the motiva-
tions of the commissioners. Some argued that the changes
were not aimed at improving care, but were instead part
of a wider programme of ﬁnancial cuts. Others felt that
the commissioners were deliberately misleading the public
about the true implications of the changes. By constructing
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 narrative that depicted the commissioners as driven by
idden motives, those opposed to the proposals were able
o dismiss the legitimacy of the commissioners’ arguments,
urther fuelling the perception that they were untrustwor-
hy.
As well as undermining trust, Wynne argues that, in the
ontext of risk communication, a failure to connect with
he local community will result in conﬂict and dissonance
19]. In non-health care settings, one way in which this
as been shown to manifest is in lay people seeking to
hallenge expert prediction and advice [22]. In the light of
ublic concerns about having to travel further for care, sev-
ral campaigners in Greenville sought to demonstrate the
mplications of the proposed changes. For example, some
ook public transport to the nearest alternative hospital, to
ighlight the challenges patients would face in the future.
thers had scrutinised the data underpinning the case for
hange, including the pre-consultation business case, and
ad submitted freedom of information requests for data
bout Greenville Hospital, as ‘part of building up evidence’
o oppose the changes. (Patient Representative 8)
The second way in which the campaigners sought to
hallenge the views of the commissioners was to invoke the
iews of other medical professionals to support their case,
rguing that local clinicians were largely opposed to the
roposals. One participant, a member of a patient involve-
ent group, described her encounters with local doctors at
he public meetings:
We’ve spoken to a lot of the doctors – consultants –
who work [at Greenville Hospital], going to these vari-
ous meetings and they are very concerned about [the
proposals]. . . I mean they have been very dedicated
coming to quite a lot of these public meetings. (Patient
Representative 5)
By framing the commissioners as heartless bureaucrats,
ntent on pushing through the changes, the campaigners
ere able to bracket them as ‘other’ and mark out a clear
ontrast with their own trusted clinicians, who in many
ases were seen to be on the side of the local community
nd opposed to the changes.
. Discussion
The public engagement methods used by commission-
rs in Greenville reﬂect the approach currently advocated
y NHS guidance, which states that ‘change must be
linically-led and underpinned by a clear clinical evi-
ence base’ [23]. As we have outlined, such an approach
ppears to assume that if local communities are presented
ith the ‘right evidence’ they will be convinced of the
eed to change [6]. This reﬂects a traditional psycho-
etric approach to risk communication, which suggests
hat the public have exaggerated fears because they hold
nsufﬁcient or incorrect information about an issue [24].
onsequently, it is assumed that efforts to reduce the
deﬁcit’ in their understanding, for example by provid-
ng additional information, will lessen their concerns [25].
owever, this model has received widespread criticism in
on-health care settings [22]. It is said to be underpinned
y several ‘ﬂawed assumptions.’ These include the belief19 (2015) 1210–1217 1215
that medical science alone can provide objective truths;
that scientiﬁc and technical experts are the only sources of
valid and rational information; and ﬁnally, that the public
is a passive receiver of risk information [26]. The accounts
of interviewees suggest that all of these were in evidence
in Greenville. The participants who  were involved in the
consultation process, including the campaigners and the
members of the wider public who  took part, believed that
their concerns were considered irrelevant and trivial by the
commissioners, who  focussed principally on communicat-
ing the clinical rationale for change.
Trust and credibility are also widely acknowledged in
the risk communication literature as major factors inﬂu-
encing the uptake and understanding of scientiﬁc messages
[19]. However, this literature also demonstrates that trust
is difﬁcult to create and easy to lose; once lost, it is dif-
ﬁcult to regain [27]. As we have shown, trust played a
pivotal role in the public’s response to the engagement pro-
cess in Greenville, particularly for those who  were actively
involved. Drawing on the deﬁcit model, the commission-
ers had sought to build trust by emphasising that the plans
had been drawn up by local clinicians. They also sought
to allay the community’s concerns via public engagement
events and publication of a document which set out the
case for change. However, the community’s belief that the
proposals were driven by ﬁnancial motives, together with
the commissioners’ actions, led to a perception that the
commissioners could not be trusted. This concern then
drove the campaigners to challenge the case for change and
invoke the contrasting views of other local doctors, which
further served to fuel their frustration and perpetuate a
cycle of mistrust.
This study provides, for the ﬁrst time, a detailed explo-
ration of the way in which local communities may  respond
to processes designed to engage them in decisions about
consolidating local hospital services on fewer sites. Using
theories of risk communication as an analytical focus, we
have been able to offer a range of new and important
insights regarding the potential impact of the engagement
approach advocated by policy. In particular, we have been
able to suggest several reasons why strategies that seek to
‘educate’ the public may  not work as expected [4]. We have
also demonstrated that, when changes to local services are
proposed, there may  be a spectrum of opinions across the
affected community, including some individuals in favour
of change. Although there were relatively small numbers
of participants in some sub-groups, such as the group in
favour of change, our work supports Parkinson’s argument
that the views of those campaigning against reconﬁgu-
ration proposals, who  are most often heard in debate,
may  not be representative of the community at large [28].
Nevertheless, our ﬁndings are based on a single reconﬁg-
uration, taking place in an urban area. They may  therefore
be less relevant in other settings, for example rural areas,
where access may  be an even bigger concern for local resi-
dents. Our ﬁndings are also based on a relatively small
number of interviews, which represents another limitation
of the study, together with the relatively small numbers
in some sub-groups. Each community and reconﬁgura-
tion proposal is also different [1] and different approaches
to public consultation may  be more or less successful in
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different areas. However, the concerns raised in Greenville
echo those raised previously by residents in other parts of
the country [1,29]. Our speciﬁc goal was to explore factors
that inﬂuence the way members of the public respond to
consultation processes. We  did not interview the commis-
sioners who were conducting the consultation. However,
the perspective of this group is clearly important in seek-
ing to develop recommendations about how to improve
the process. Additional qualitative research involving those
running consultations would provide important insights
about their goals; the underlying rationale for their chosen
approach; and their perceptions of facilitators and barriers
to effective engagement.
The reconﬁguration of stroke services in London has
been cited as an example of good public engagement
practice [21]. Some argue that the changes in London
were implemented with relatively little opposition because
clinical leaders played a prominent role in articulating
the rationale behind the proposals [21]. However, clini-
cal leadership and a detailed explanation of the case for
change failed to change the opinion of many participants
in Greenville. As a possible explanation for this differ-
ence, other studies have observed that the strength of local
opposition is related to the content of the reconﬁgura-
tion proposals, particularly the extent to which services are
being withdrawn. Where reconﬁguration is perceived as a
‘downgrading’ of service provision, there is more conﬂict
[6]. Crucially, in London, although some hospitals lost their
acute stroke services, the reorganisation did not result in
changes to ED service provision, or other services which
may  be particularly important for the public, such as mater-
nity and paediatrics [6]. It is possible that the relative lack of
conﬂict in London was at least partly due to this. In contrast,
in Greenville, clinical leadership of the proposals appears
to have been insufﬁcient to change the opinion of most
study participants when emergency services were being
withdrawn. Indeed, the literature on environmental risks
strongly suggests that this approach is not sufﬁcient for the
provision of credible scientiﬁc advice [18].
In Figure 1, we cited the Independent Reconﬁguration
Panel’s assessment of key shortcomings in local consul-
tation processes [1]. We  have used this assessment to
frame our recommendations. Our ﬁndings offer important
insights into why these issues create concern amongst local
communities; how communication might be improved;
and where additional research would be valuable. First,
however, it is important to set this in context. Spurgeon
et al. assert that within the setting of the current English
NHS, there is a ‘likelihood that conﬂict over hospital recon-
ﬁguration will persist’ [4]. Our work outlines some reasons
why this may  be the case. However, whilst reconﬁguration
proposals involve the withdrawal of services, we suggest
that there can be no ‘magic bullet’ that will lead to their
smooth acceptance. This is not least because members of
the public appear to interpret the implications of recon-
ﬁguration plans in a different way to commissioners and
clinicians, particularly with respect to quality and safety
[20]. Nevertheless, the IRP note that in many reconﬁgura-
tion situations, the consultation process is ﬂawed because
‘the clinical case has not been convincingly described or
promoted’ [1]. In contrast, in Greenville, the case for change19 (2015) 1210–1217
was  comprehensively outlined, but we have also explained
why  this approach may  also fail to convince the pub-
lic. Instead, the Kings Fund suggest that a ‘conversation’
needs to take place between clinicians and populations
[12]. Our ﬁndings support this and we also suggest that
this dialogue should take into account the way in which
risk is interpreted by the public in this context, draw-
ing from other related areas, such as health protection
[22]. We recommend that further qualitative research is
undertaken to identify practical ways in which consulta-
tion processes could be improved, for example, patient and
public preferences for involvement in decision-making;
views of change leaders regarding obstacles to engagement
and how they might be overcome; and how these stake-
holder groups view recommendations to improve existing
approaches to involvement. The IRP also highlight the prob-
lem of ‘important content missing from reconﬁguration
plans and limited methods of conveying information.’ In
Greenville, a wealth of information was  provided but par-
ticipants argued that the consultation information did not
clearly state what would happen to some services, fuelling
mistrust. In future, commissioners must ensure that local
communities are ‘clear what services will be provided,
where and how they will access them’ [1]. Crucially, the
public in Greenville also did not believe that the ques-
tionnaire gave them opportunity to oppose the proposals.
Finally, the IRP also highlight ‘inadequate attention given
to the responses during and after the consultation’ [1]. The
panel advise that commissioners should take time to con-
sider responses. We  would go further to recommend that
decision-makers should explicitly acknowledge and proac-
tively address public responses to the consultation, as part
of their ‘conversation’ with local communities. Our explo-
ration of the ways in which the public respond to both the
method of consultation, and the content of reconﬁgura-
tion proposals [20], offers commissioners new insights into
why the public may  respond in certain ways – for example
around the safety implications of service reorganisation –
which may  help those planning reconﬁgurations in future.
5. Conclusion
Our study challenges the assumption that evidence can
be used to persuade communities to accommodate service
reorganisations which may  compromise timely access [6].
Drawing on theories of risk communication has led to new
knowledge about the potential impact of methods cur-
rently used to engage the public. In particular, rather than
improving trust, the approach advocated by policy [1,3,12]
may  in fact have the opposite effect and contribute to
public opposition. This is partly because it assumes that
technical experts are the only sources of valid and ratio-
nal advice, whilst the public are merely passive receivers
of risk information [26]. Current recommendations seek
to improve the consultation process by providing the
public with more details about the case for change. How-
ever, this approach may  fuel resistance amongst the local
community, if commissioners continue to regard medical
knowledge as pre-eminent and fail to acknowledge resi-
dents’ local knowledge and perspectives on health care.
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